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Abstract
Street-level bureaucrats are considered to be subject to bureaucratic managerial regimes
and threatened by stronger regulation and a reduction in their ability to exercise control
over their work. Contrary to the managerial approach, predicting curtailment of professional
autonomy, theorists foretell the continuing importance of discretion in the translation of social
objectives into actual service delivery. Given such opposite predictions, what is the perceived
direction of change and scope for independent decision-making for front-line workers? This
paper empirically investigates the contradictory hypotheses predicting continuing or declining
opportunities for street-level discretion in a context of activation policies and welfare reforms.
The data come from two surveys conducted among practitioners and local managers in the
Norwegian employment and welfare services in 2004 and 2011. Despite managerial control and
bureaucratic procedures that regulate many decisions, discretion still remains a characteristic
of front-line work. Continued discretion is closely related to the implementation of activation
goals and the merging of tasks and integrated services following the whole-of-government
reform. The findings confirm the role of managers as key players in implementing policies at
the local level. Concurrently, the discretionary power of trained social workers is decreasing
and challenged by the push for uniform practices and a managerially regulated role.
Introduction
According to the literature, the active role of street-level bureaucrats in the imple-
mentation of politics is being challenged and disputed. The work environment
of welfare services is changing, resulting in more prescription of policy, increased
management of aims and methods and more regulation and control of proce-
dures, outputs and costs (Clark, 2005). As professionals, street-level bureaucrats
are subject to management reforms and new policies for public service delivery,
as well as to the threats posed by stronger regulation and reduction in their
opportunities for exercising control (Freidson, 2001; Evetts, 2003). The potential
consequences are decreased professionalism and increased bureaucracy for wel-
fare services (De Bruijn, 2011). This change has taken place in several countries and
has become a ‘universal trend’ affecting the majority of state social workers (Healy
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and Meagher, 2004). Studies in countries like Australia, the United Kingdom
and Canada indicate an erosion of opportunities for professional discretion in
front-line practice and a loss of workplace conditions that enable professional
development (Harris and McDonald, 2000; Jones, 2001). The changes taking place
are characterised by a shift in ideology towards managerial forms of organisational
control, regulations and methods of coordinating public services (Clarke et al.,
2000). Former administrators of welfare organisations are being replaced by
managers responsible for organisational goals and by regimes of performance
measurement and inspections (Harris and White, 2009). This growth of
management regimes entails a decisive power shift in public services away
from practitioners’ discretion and towards a practice defined by guidelines and
procedures – designed by administrators and driven by managers (Howe, 1991).
Theorists disagree as to the extent that public service reforms and managerial
regulations have changed the autonomous position of professionals and restricted
their opportunities for making discretionary decisions (Evans and Harris, 2004).
Contrary to predictions of curtailment, Hupe and Hill (2007) argue that the
discretion of front-line officers still plays a key role in the translation of social
objectives into actual service delivery. According to studies, activation policies
imply a wide scope for discretion, adding opportunities to judge and control
behaviour and exercising influence over what activation actually means (Handler,
2003; Jewell, 2007; Thore´n, 2008; Fletcher, 2011; Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2012).
Tailor-made services have gained more weight, and social protection schemes
have become more individualised and less standardised (Van Berkel and Valken-
burg, 2007). Several activation programmes make new demands on local admin-
istrations to make individualised choices regarding obligations and to monitor
sanctions. Allowing for discretion in street-level bureaucracies may therefore be
part of an implementation strategy to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
activation services. Thus, street-level discretion will have continuing importance
and cannot be eradicated from organisations responsible for activation.
This paper addresses the issues of autonomy and street-level discretion by
investigating the perceived opportunities of welfare workers within a context
of organisational and policy reforms. The empirical data come from two
surveys conducted among practitioners and local managers before and after
the Norwegian labour and welfare reform was implemented in 2006. A main
issue is to investigate the opposite hypotheses predicting continuing or declining
discretion of street-level bureaucrats by empirically examining the direction of
change in front-line services.
The context of changing policies and welfare state reforms
In several countries, major welfare state reforms aimed at promoting interagency
co-operation have been implemented (Van Berkel, 2011). The reforms represent
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 17 Mar 2014 IP address: 158.36.98.175
discretionary decision-making in activation policies 271
increasingly important aspects of the delivery of income protection and activation
programmes for unemployed people. To increase the capacity and efficiency
of the public administration, the Norwegian employment and welfare reform
was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in 2006 and a joint front-line service
(one-stop shops) was established in all municipalities.1 A ‘one-door’ policy was
established through the coordination of comprehensive services (Ministry of
Health and Care Services, 2004: 13). On the one hand, the central government
was strengthened by uniting the two national administrations of social insurance
and labour market services into one governmental administration. On the other
hand, the division of tasks between the central state and the municipalities was
maintained by establishing local partnerships and keeping social services as a local
responsibility. The reform implies a change towards the whole-of-government
approach that has taken place in several countries as a means to achieve shared
goals, performance regulation and increased coordination of service delivery
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007).
The main goals of this reform were to get clients off welfare and into work, to
create a more efficient administrative apparatus and to make the administration
more service oriented (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004–05). The
employment and welfare administration was expected to provide an entire
range of integrated services, making it responsible for many services including
employment, sick leave, medical and occupational rehabilitation, disability
pensions, financial social assistance, family benefits and pension services. A
reorganisation of the social security benefit schemes was announced to change
the utilisation of resources from administrative allocation to active measures
(Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2006–07).
Traditionally, social assistance in Norway has had a strong element of work
testing (Lødemel, 2001). The main responsibility for social assistance services is to
provide a final safety net for individuals in need by ensuring adequate resources
are available and helping clients become self-supporting.2 Claimants must seek
and be willing to take work offered and are expected to participate in work training
programmes organised by labour market authorities. The enactment of the Social
Services Act in 1991 introduced a new principle into modern Norwegian social
assistance, allowing local authorities to require recipients of social assistance to
work in exchange for benefits or participate in educational training programmes.
Selectivity and targeting within social assistance were restored as desirable features
of welfare provisions (Lødemel, 1997). During the reform, a new qualification
programme related to social services was introduced, targeting social assistance
recipients with substantially reduced work and earning capacity. The programme
requires work-related activity and provides close and binding follow-up in a
contractual way that involves opportunities for independent discretion.
In general, the activation policies are intended to influence individual action
and to connect social rights to conditions. In several new welfare regimes,
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active labour market benefits have become conditional; rights and benefits
begin if obligations are fulfilled, and the recipients are obliged to participate
in work activities (Handler, 2003).3 An important feature of the Norwegian
activation policies has been the emphasis on the so-called ‘work-line’, expressed
by strengthening the qualifying conditions for unemployment, disability and
sickness benefits (Drøpping et al., 1991). One main intention is to bring people
who are in marginal employment situations into the workforce by offering
support in the sense of close follow-up, adapted training and qualification and
activation programmes (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2006–07). The
recipients are enabled through activation programmes, using instruments for
testing work capability and readiness and stricter follow-up through individual
plans. As opposed to stricter policies (as in the United Kingdom), this approach
is based on the generous type of activation policies that emphasise education
and training over direct labour market participation; it is often characterised as
social investment or enabling activation policies (Gilbert, 2002; Aurich, 2011).
The work-line, however, has led to a renewed emphasis on the obligations and
sanctions within the social protection system, as well as within social assistance
(Hvinden and Johansson, 2007). Thus, some of the requirements for receiving
public benefits and financial assistance are to meet the terms and conditions set
by the local welfare administration.
Theoretical approaches
Professionals traditionally possess autonomy in the performance of their work
and the authority to make independent decisions on certain technical issues,
such as what tasks to perform, how to carry them out and what the aim of the
work should be. According to theory, discretion occurs whenever ‘the effective
limits on his [the public official’s] power leave him free to make a choice among
possible courses of action or inaction’ (Davis, 1969: 4). In social work literature,
a distinction is drawn between the kind of discretionary freedom that occurs in
the circumstance of practice and the freedom that is formally allocated by the
authorities (Evans, 2010). The former dimension, referred to as de facto discretion,
involves the capacity to act and decide without officially recognised entitlement.
This may be caused by ambiguous rules and the absence of effective control; in
the literature, it is also called relative autonomy by default (Hvinden, 1994). The
latter dimension, referred to as de jure discretion, involves the official approval
to decide a social right or to assess needs and measures. Discretionary power is
then allocated by the central administration or by the policymakers, relative to
standards set by the same authority. Traditionally, the delegation of discretionary
power – a space left open by an authority – is based on the assumption that
professionals are capable of passing judgements and making reasonable decisions
(Molander and Grimen, 2010). In the public welfare administration, discretionary
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decision-making may involve simple interpretations of rules to decide who
satisfies the eligibility criteria, or types of judgements where the rules are
ambiguous or require complex assessments (Ham and Hill, 1993).
According to Lipsky (1980), discretion is an inevitable and continuing
component of social welfare policy administration, related to unclear goals,
conflicts of interest and technical limits to monitoring. Because front-line workers
have an active role in implementing and interpreting policy, they must interact
with and make discretionary decisions about clients, determining eligibility
claims and choosing the course of action. Discretionary reasoning is also regarded
as necessary for flexible and individualised treatment and is needed to ensure
that means are responsive to individual needs. The definition of workers’ tasks
often calls for sensitive observation and de facto discretionary judgements that are
unavoidable if they are to be able to respond to unexpected situations (Thore´n,
2009). The continuing importance of discretion has also been augmented by
studies concerned with the existence of professional discretion in social services
(Ellis et al., 1999; Baldwin, 2000). The Lipsky approach to street-level discretion,
however, only partly explains the pattern of discretion that legally occurs in
modern decentralised welfare services. Discretion occurs not only because
technical limits are in place to monitor street-level performance, but also because
professionals are required to develop a workable policy in practice (Evans, 2011).
Contrary to the thesis predicting the continuing importance of discretion
in street-level bureaucracies, critics foretell the curtailment of professional
autonomy and decreased discretion as management regimes and managers seize
control over street-level practice (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Harris, 1998; Jones,
2001). Increasing criticism of professional discretion in public administration
has led to demands for a reduction in professional power and for increased
control of processes requiring discretionary decisions (Evetts, 2006). The answer
has been stricter rules and administrative procedures, management tools and
budgetary controls and new policies for public service delivery. According to
several theorists, the management reforms decrease opportunities for exercising
discretion through formal regulation and standardisation and give professionals
fewer opportunities to choose broad objectives (Healy and Meagher, 2004; Clark,
2005). The alleged curtailment is caused by the changing context of welfare
services, emphasising the role of managers as key players in implementing
politics and prescription by management of aims and methods of intervention
(Clark, 2005).
In addition, new information and communication technologies (ICT)
introduced into welfare services brings important changes for civil servants’
work. They are assumed to transform street-level bureaucracies and agencies
into screen-level or system-level bureaucracies, implying curtailing effects on
discretion (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002). The authors argue that contact with
citizens no longer takes place in meeting rooms, but through modems and web
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sites (2002: 180). The active role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation
and interpretation of politics is thereby challenged and disputed by theorists
claiming curtailment of discretionary power.
Assumptions
We investigate the predictions of curtailment and continuation of street-level
discretion by empirically examining the experiences of front-line workers
within the Norwegian welfare administration at different points in time. Given
the increased focus on activation – allowing for conditional claims and the
closer follow-up of clients – (i) we assume that opportunities for discretion and
independent decision-making remain unchanged for front-line workers responsible
for activation.
According to the literature, managers are the key regulators of discretion,
accountable for the quality of services provided and decisions made (Lipsky, 1991).
In the wake of public sector reforms, management tools and managerial power
have increased (De Bruijn, 2011). Managers are committed to the organisation
for which they work rather than the profession to which they belong and thus
are obliged to implement and enforce hierarchically directed policy (Harris and
White, 2009). Therefore, (ii) we expect the organisational reform to change the
scope for autonomy to the advantage of local managers.
In line with current studies, we also expect the professional identity
and knowledge-based status of social workers to influence the nature of
their discretion and the way in which it is perceived and managed (Evans,
2011). Increasing governmental control and standardising of employment and
welfare services probably make it more difficult for trained social workers to
follow professional standards related to a knowledge-based culture. According
to the curtailment perspective, predicting an increase in administrative and
managerially driven practice for professionals, (iii) we assume that trained social
workers will report fewer opportunities for de jure discretion and independent
decision-making.
Data and variable constructions
The empirical data come from two surveys of public welfare workers, conducted
in 2004 and 2011, from a random sample of all 435 Norwegian municipalities. To
obtain a representative sample, the municipalities were stratified into two groups,
based on a population size above or below 100,000 people, resulting in groups of
five and 430 municipalities, respectively. A 25 per cent sample of municipalities
with a population below 100,000 people was randomly selected, and a 40 per cent
sample of the local district administrations in each of the municipalities with
a population above 100,000 people was randomly selected. Oslo, the largest
municipality, was not included because its administration was being reorganised
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at that time. This selection of survey locations was created for the 2004 survey and
reused for the 2011 survey. All front-line workers in the selected survey locations
were invited to participate in both surveys.
The 2004 data are based on a postal questionnaire with a response rate of
68.0 per cent (1,146 respondents). Overall, 60 per cent of the respondents
were central government employees working within the social insurance
administration, and 40 per cent were workers employed in social services (local
authority administrations). The gender distribution shows a predominance of
female workers (80 per cent). The sample has a predominance of practitioners
(83 per cent), compared to a smaller group of local managers (17 per cent).
The 2011 data are based on an online questionnaire with a response rate of
59.5 per cent (1,758 respondents). The respondents were from the
new employment and welfare agencies (Norwegian Labour and Welfare
Administration [NAV]) covering the joint services of both governmental and
municipal authorities. Background information on the 2011 respondents is
presented in Table 1.
Dependent variables
The dependent variables capture the structural dimensions of autonomy and
discretion for front-line workers in terms of perceived opportunities and direction
of change. To analyse the trend of continuation or curtailment of discretionary
decision-making, we compare the perceptions of front-line workers in 2004
(before the reform) and 2011 (after the reform). The following questions/prompts
were used in the analyses:
• In my job I have very little freedom to decide how I will carry out my tasks.
• To what extent do you have the opportunity to exercise independent discretion?
Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the
first statement, based on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (‘disagree completely’)
through4 (‘agree completely’). The second question had a five-point scale ranging
from 1 (‘not at all’) through 5 (‘very often or always’).
In 2011, the following question was used to examine the perceived direction
of change:
• Do you experience more or fewer opportunities to make independent decisions
since the NAV reform was implemented?
This question is related to the period after the two separate governmental
administrations of social insurance and unemployment were merged with social
services at the local authority level. The question was formulated with five
response categories ranging from ‘much more’ to ‘much fewer’ opportunities
and was recoded into three main categories in the statistical analyses.
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TABLE 1. Frequency distributions of background
information 2011
N 1,758
Women 79%
Age (mean) 46 years
Positions:
Managers 14%
Practitioners 86%
Former work practices:
Social services (only) 28%
Insurance Services (only) 21%
Employment Services (only) 21%
Other/mixed 40%
NAV-experience:
> 1 year 4%
1–2 years 54%
3–4 years 32%
5 years 5%
6 years 5%
Work field/tasks∗:
Case handling/information 64%
Decision making 58%
Follow up special needs 41%
Follow up sick leave 23%
Activation measures 47%
Social services 41%
Educational background∗:
Social work 32%
Social studies 29%
Economy/administration 21%
Law studies 12%
Other 35%
Note: ∗Multiple responses allowed.
Independent variables (2011)
Occupational position
This dichotomous variable distinguishes between the two positions of
managers and practitioners (cf. Assumption ii).
Work fields. These variables differentiate among the tasks related to (1) case
handling, (2) decisions-making, (3) follow-up of clients with special needs, (4)
follow-up of sick leave recipients and (5) employment and activation measures.
The work fields differentiate among the five municipal social services and the
governmental insurance and employment services (used as a reference category
in the regression analysis). The main tasks of social services are activation
work, financial social assistance and case work related to psychiatric health care,
drug abuse and child welfare. In the new joint services, most practitioners are
responsible for handling cases and applications for various benefits, whereas
others are specifically responsible for the provision of advice to clients and
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the follow-up of recipients (vocational rehabilitation, sick leave, disability,
social assistance, etc.). The front-line workers responsible for employment and
activation measures assessing and improving the labour market participation of
various groups of recipients are expected to have a wider scope of discretion than
others (cf. Assumption (i)).
Profession/educational background. This dichotomous variable distinguishes
between trained social workers and officers with other types of educational
backgrounds (cf. Assumption (iii)). In addition, age, gender and years of former
and current work practices are included as control variables. The main categories
of former practices (obtained in social services, social insurance and employment
services before the reform) are constructed into mutually exclusive dummy
variables. Table 1 shows the frequency distributions for the independent variables.
Method
The first part of the study investigates changes in perceived opportunities for
autonomy and discretion from 2004 to 2011 by cross-tabulations. In the second
part of the study, we investigate whether front-line workers in 2011 experience
an increase (more and much more), a decrease (fewer and much fewer) or no
change (unchanged) in the number of opportunities for making independent
decisions after the reform. The dependent variable has three categories, and a
multi-nominal logistic regression model that assumes the dependent variable to
be at the nominal level is used.4 This model allows us to examine how different
variables influence whether front-line workers experience an increase, a decrease
or no change in the number of opportunities available.
The multi-nominal regression model is performed with unchanged
opportunities as the base category, to which the log likelihoods of the other
two opportunity categories are compared. The analysis produces two sets of
coefficients. The first set consists of the log odds for fewer versus unchanged
opportunities. The other set of coefficients consists of the log odds for more versus
unchanged opportunities. In addition to the coefficients, we present predicted
probabilities showing the effect of important independent variables when all
other independent variables are set to the mean value (this is also the case for
dichotomous variables).
Results
Changing opportunities for autonomy and discretion?
To examine the question of changing opportunities for autonomy and
discretion, we first compared the responses of different categories of workers,
collected before and after the implementation of the administrative reform.
Figure 1 shows the responses of practitioners compared to those of managers and
the responses of workers in the municipal social services compared to those of
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Exercise discreon independently Freedom to decide how to carry out the tasks
Figure 1. The scope for autonomy and discretion of front-line workers before and after the
employment and welfare reform, by positions and services (per cent)
Note: The responses shown are ‘high degree’ (combining the two highest response categories
4+ 5 on the five-point scale), and ‘agree’ (combining the highest two response categories 3+ 4
on the four-point scale). In 2011, the governmental services included both the employment
and social insurance. In 2004, the governmental services included the social insurance services
only. The differences between social services in 2004 and 2011 are significant at p< 0.001 for
‘exercise discretion independently’, and at p< 0.05 for ‘freedom to decide how to carry out the
tasks’. The difference for governmental services are significant at p< 0.01 for ‘exercise discretion
independently’ (Fisher’s exact test was used).
workers responsible for governmental services (social insurance officers in 2004
and NAV officers in 2011).
A comparison of the surveys conducted in 2004 and 2011 indicates little or no
change in the front-line workers’ perceptions of their own degree of autonomy
and discretion. Despite different occupational positions, a large majority of both
managers and practitioners reported a high degree of freedom in deciding how
they would carry out their tasks in both time periods. The proportion reporting
that they, to a large extent, can independently exercise discretion is somewhat
lower in both groups but still relatively high. A relatively higher proportion of
managers reported a high degree of autonomy and discretion than practitioners.
The differences between the two positions reflect the fact that managers are
delegated a relatively high degree of decision-making authority owing to their
administrative position.
When we compared governmental services and municipal social services,
a relatively high proportion among both groups of employees reported a high
degree of autonomy regarding how they carry out their tasks in both time periods.
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However, the findings indicate a small decrease in the degree of autonomy for
workers in the social services. The proportion of workers in the governmental
services reporting a high degree of discretion was significantly higher in 2011 than
in 2004, indicating a shift towards an increase in the number of opportunities
available to exercise discretion. For social service workers, however, the findings
indicate a decrease in the opportunities available to exercise discretion during
the same time period. Thus, the gap between workers within the two services
concerning the question of discretion was narrowed during the time period,
calculated in terms of decreasing percentage differences (amounting to 36 per
cent in 2004 and 18 per cent in 2011; p< 0.001).
Continuing or decreasing opportunities for independent
decision-making?
To elaborate further on the issue of changes in the number of opportunities
available for discretionary decision-making, we investigated the workers’
experiences of continuing or decreasing opportunities after the reform. The
results are presented in Table 2 in terms of estimated coefficients from the
multi-nominal logistic regression analysis of changes (fewer or continuing)
in the number of opportunities available to make independent decisions in
the NAV agencies. The dependent variable has three categories, in which the
unchanged (same) opportunity of making independent decisions represents the
category to which the other opportunity outcomes are compared. Values in bold
indicate statistically significant results for the responses of ‘fewer’ and ‘more’
opportunities. Figure 2 shows predicted probabilities for the significant variables.
As shown in Table 2, there are statistically significant coefficients for
occupational position, profession and work fields (decision-making, follow-
up/sick leave, activation measures) and age. Because coefficients from multi-
nominal logistic regressions are difficult and less intuitive to interpret, estimated
probabilities are presented in Figure 2. Probabilities for the different outcomes
for changing (more/unchanged/fewer) opportunities are reported along the x-
axis, and work practice, position, various work fields and professional group are
listed along the y-axis.
According to Figure 2, the analysis indicates continuities in terms of
unchanged and more opportunities for independent decision-making in both
positions (managers and practitioners) after the reform. The probability of
increasing decision-making for the job categories in terms of more opportunities
is perceived chiefly by managers. About 42 per cent are estimated to report
more opportunities for making independent decisions after the NAV reform.
Correspondingly, the predicted probability of reporting more opportunities
among practitioners is 21 per cent. Despite a stronger regime of management,
the estimated probability of perceiving continuing (unchanged) opportunities
for practitioners in general is 45 per cent.
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TABLE 2. Multi-nominal regression analyses predicting changing
opportunities (less/unchanged/more) to make independent decisions, by age,
gender, work position, current and former work experience, work fields/ tasks
and profession (2011).
LESS MORE
Variables B SE(B) B SE(B)
Intercept − 0.061 0.433 0.644 0.472
Position (manager = 1) − 0.192 0.207 0.916∗∗∗ 0.195
Work fields/ tasks
Case handling 0.130 0.159 0.027 0.183
Decision making − 0.345∗ 0.151 − 0.347∗ 0.172
Follow-up special needs − 0.120 0.143 − 0.244 0.164
Follow-up sick leave 0.112 0.169 0.421∗ 0.182
Activation measures/employment 0.264 0.148 0.425∗ 0.169
Social services − 0.161 0.173 0.195 0.192
Profession (social worker = 1) 0.209 0.190 -0.443∗ 0.216
Gender (woman = 1) 0.272 0.163 0.208 0.181
Age − 0.003 0.007 − 0.026∗∗∗ 0.008
Current NAV-experience (years) 0.035 0.046 0.155 0.051
Former work practices:
Employment services (only = 1) − 0.471 0.296 − 1.148∗∗∗ 0.302
Social insurance (only = 1) − 0.108 0.302 − 0.520 0.302
Social services (only = 1) − 0.119 0.298 − 0.674∗ 0.307
Mixed practices − 0.585 0.356 − 0.478 0.341
(ref.cat.: other practices)
N observations = 1,327
Notes: Significance levels: ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001. PseodoR2 = ,093 (Nagelkerke).
Reference category = unchanged (same) opportunities. Bold values indicate significant
differences between ‘less’ and ’more’ opportunities of making independent decisions, in
comparison to ‘unchanged’. (Missing: N = 431, including the category ‘do not know/not
relevant’).
The predicted probabilities for perceiving autonomous decision-making and
independent choices are, however, increasingly altered for workers responsible
for implementing the policy of activation in various fields. Those responsible for
follow-up of sick leave and for activation measures and employment programmes
are more likely to be assigned a higher degree of autonomy compared to other
NAV workers. Still, the predicted opportunities for workers responsible for social
services and the follow-up of clients with special needs are the same (unchanged)
over the time period before and after the reform (2006–11). The probability of
reporting decreasing decision-making is higher for trained social workers (38 per
cent) than for the other occupations (30 per cent) represented.
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Figure 2. The probability of changing opportunities (fewer, unchanged or more) to make
independent decisions, by positions, work fields/tasks (activation measures, follow-up
sick leave, decision making) and professions (per cent), based on logistic regression
Note: The rate of those who answered ‘did not know’ has been included in the missing category
and is not shown in the figure.
Discussion
The empirical findings (Figures 1 and 2) confirm the assumption that there
are persisting opportunities for discretion and independent decision-making
for front-line workers within the Norwegian welfare administration in general.
Despite the impact of managerial standards and regulations, front-line workers
are still able to make independent decisions concerning how to carry out their
work within the frame of the new administrative regime. This result is in part
caused by the implementation of the Norwegian activation policies that restricted
eligibility rules and encouraged vocational rehabilitation and job training instead
of social benefits and long-term insurance (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
1991–1992). Front-line workers responsible for activation measures and follow-
up (particularly for sick leave) are significantly more likely to perceive increased
opportunities for independent decision-making (Table 2 and Figure 2). The
perceived direction of change is in accordance with the priority area of Norwegian
welfare policy emphasising inclusion, active intervention and rehabilitation of
individuals on long-term sick leave and those on disability benefits (Ministry
of Labour, 2000). According to the national agreement on a more inclusive
working life and the National Insurance Act of 2007, stronger requirements are
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set for more activity-oriented measures early in the sick leave period. During
this period, advisors are obliged to follow up by initiating dialogue meetings
and a follow-up plan in cooperation with the employee so as to prevent long
absences. A policy of inclusive working life thus involves increased opportunities
for independent decision-making in the governmental front-line services.
In addition, more requirements were established for activity-oriented
measures and profiling tools during the reform so as to assess whether the
claimants are employable or have a limited capacity to seek work. Because
the range of measures and programmes has been more differentiated, and the
provision of services has become more tailor-made, opportunities for front-
line decision-making and a more personalised approach have increased. The
results are in line with European studies suggesting that front-line workers have
considerable room to exercise discretion when providing activation services, thus
exercising influence over what activation actually means (Van Berkel and Van der
Aa, 2012).
The findings also suggest an increase in the degree of discretion exercised by
core workers within the governmental services over the time period (Table 2). The
increase partly results from the merger of the employment and social insurance
administrations, expanding the work fields and task responsibilities of both
practitioners and managers. The ‘whole-of-government’ approach brought an
extended delegation of tasks and authorities to the new joint services, involving
additional responsibilities for counselling and closer interaction when following
up on beneficiaries. The increasing emphasis on closer follow-up for the long-
term unemployed, those on sick leave and for disability benefit recipients
presupposes involvement in client relations and more decisions based on means–
ends judgements, in line with the traditional mandate of the social services. In
summary, the findings indicate that independent decision-making has become
more similar in scope for professional and non-professional workers employed
within different parts of the new employment and welfare administration.
The comparative data, collected before and after the welfare reform,
mainly suggest continuing discretion for practitioners in general and increasing
autonomy for local managers in particular (Figure 1). The high degree of
discretionary opportunities and the high degree of autonomy reported in both
periods are mainly part of the management reforms within public services. In
addition to controlling the work of staff members to ensure that routines are
followed, local managers are accountable for achieving results in accordance with
political goals. The transformation of joint services into the new administration
called for managerial interventions and new strategies to meet the challenges
involved (Klemsdal, 2011). Because the reform was designed according to a
minimum of critical specification goals, the concepts and requirements had to be
translated into concrete procedures and routines by local managers (Askim et al.,
2010). Thus, managers were granted a key role in implementing the reform. They
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were responsible for coordinating the services and promoting the developmental
changes required. Most likely, the increase in perceived autonomy (Figure 2)
results from the assigned responsibilities for administering the multiple tasks
and the expanded laws and regulations following the reform.
Despite this overall trend of continuing discretion, the data indicate
decreasing opportunities to exercise street-level discretion in the municipal social
services, as reported by employees prior to and after the reform (Figure 1). In the
case of social assistance, ordinary claims are regulated by departmental guidelines,
and more procedures and guidelines are adapted to assess the needs and work
capability of claimants. Because of increasing standardisation, case workers have
limited influence on the outcome of social assistance in cases not covered by
delegation rules.
Similarly, the probability of decreasing opportunities for decision-making
is higher for trained social workers than for other occupations and non-
professional groups (Figure 2). Increasing pressure on organisational guidelines
probably makes it more difficult for social workers to practise in accordance
with their professional standards and comprehensive holistic approach of social
work (Røysum, 2012). The complexity of problems related to the provision of
social assistance to long-term recipients often presupposes a holistic approach,
where social workers must relate to several aspects of the life situation of clients.
Following the reform, social workers experience more detailed and formalised
requirements and increased expectations to simplify work. The assessment made
for providing the appropriate type of activation services in terms of benefit and
follow-up, however, has become partly standardised, based on a more structured
procedure for collecting information on the needs, life situation and resources of
claimants. Seemingly then, the traditional social work approach is challenged by
the administrative elements of activation work, which regulate both professional
practice and the social services.
Conclusions
This article explores the changing opportunities for street-level discretion within
a context of organisational and policy reforms. On the whole, the perceived
direction of change confirms the thesis of ‘continuation’ predicting unchanged
opportunities for street-level discretion in the Norwegian public employment
and welfare services. In line with Lipsky’s theories (1980, 1991), street-level
bureaucrats still exercise considerable discretion in determining the claims, means
and sanctions required. As discussed, the continuing course is closely related
to the delegation of authorities to local administrations and the co-ordination
between different tasks and activation measures, involving a greater variety of
working processes to be managed by front-line workers. Working in the front-
line of public services, street-level bureaucrats mediate between institutions and
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citizens, participating in decision-making regarding what services to provide and
how to respond to issues that arise (Hjo¨rne et al., 2010).
To implement the goals of the Norwegian employment and welfare reform,
local managers were granted the key role as reform agents, subject to the main
efficiency targets of the modern welfare administration. Although management
control takes different forms in various settings, greater emphasis has been placed
in recent years on the responsibilities of managers with regard to budgetary
control, performance monitoring and quality of service. The results signal a shift
towards managerial forms of control and organisational regulations, including
an increase in managing professional discretion (White, 2009).
Moreover, activation policies are strongly emphasised as part of the reform
process, involving individualised and mandatory services aimed at increasing
participation and responsible behaviour that potentially enlarges the scope for
street-level discretion (Jewell, 2007; Bonvin, 2008). Activation strategies imply
stricter follow-up of recipients and individual plans, presupposing frequent
interactions associated with increased decisions and, again, an enlarged scope
for activation measures for both professionals and non-professionals. The
Norwegian policy allows case workers to use their expertise and authority in
a flexible and pedagogical way, an ‘enabling approach’ rather than a coercive
one. Activation measures have become more diversified than previously, making
available a range of programme offerings and targeting several groups of
beneficiaries. Consequently, more choices have to be made about the kind
of services required, extending the use of discretionary tools by practitioners
responsible for labour market measures.
However, comparisons of front-line practices in different countries
undertaking similar reforms suggest that activation policies and service provision
models can affect social work in different ways (Marston et al., 2005).
According to our findings, the perceived decrease of discretionary opportunities
among Norwegian social workers raises the prospect of curtailment rather
than continuity for this professional group. Recent studies show that Norway
has become eager to implement NPM reforms over the last few years,
moving towards market, management and efficiency (Christensen et al., 2007).
Most likely, the increase in regulations, new procedures and performance
measurements will limit the opportunities of choosing broad objectives and
social treatment methods. Managerial tools and indicators of performance are
increasingly regulating professional practice through guidelines and procedures
that define the assessment processes more strictly (Sol and Westerveld,
2005). The technical subordination of social services to a governmental and
administrative rule-oriented culture makes social work more exposed to
transformations. The changes involve a move towards a more managerially
regulated role that challenges the professionally regulated role of social workers in
particular.
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As part of the reform, the services are both subjected to the governmental
management regime, emphasising stricter rules and administrative procedures,
and to the new information and communication technology (ICT), regulating
social work practice. When the decision-making process is automated by
electronic tools and applications, the intervention and discretionary power of
professionals may decrease. However, the information technology system also
provides agents with a whole range of data on clients, thus allowing them to exert
closer control over the beneficiaries (Buffat, 2013). In this way, the new technology
may both have a restraining and an enabling effect on the agent’s discretionary
power over clients.
In addition, the traditional role of front-line workers is changing as they
become more directly involved in supporting job activation. By moving away
from the ‘caseworker’ role that mainly controls eligibility criteria for income
protection and welfare services, activation workers also decide the eligibility rights
of activation measures and programmes. The increasing emphasis on activation
and tailor-made assistance to help people find and sustain employment requires
front-line workers to focus on work readiness and labour market outcomes. As
providers of activation services, they are instructed to assess needs and work
ability, considering conditions and the utility of different activation means and
work programmes. The changes involved indicate that conditional requirements
and norms of self-support have become the legitimate institutional standard for
follow-up of applicants, making the social work approach less creative and more
disciplinary. In brief, a ‘regulatory approach’ embedded in activation services
and policy reforms may signify a process of transformation and fragmentation
of street-level practice.
Notes
1 Overall, 457 local NAV offices (one-stop shops) were established throughout the 435
municipalities. At the regional level, both administrative units and back-office units with
special competencies were established to handle services defined as individual rights,
primarily concerning pensions.
2 In Norway, the functions of cash allocation and social work are not separated as they are
in many other countries. The clientele who are dependent on social assistance are mainly
individuals suffering from problems not covered by social insurance.
3 Compared to many other Western countries, the Norwegian labour market policy is seen as
more generous with respect to benefits and compliance rules. The policies are characterised
by social rights to income replacement in certain risk situations (sickness, unemployment,
lone parents, etc.) by relatively high universal benefits.
4 The Brant test of parallel regression (proportional odds) assumption indicates that an ordered
probit or logistic regression model is not appropriate.
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